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Abstract
The War of the Spanish Succession affected the entire continent of Europe directly or indirectly. Within the Spanish 
monarchy, most of the states in the Crown of Aragon sided with Archduke Charles of Austria (Charles III), while Crown 
of Castile lent its support to Duke Philip of Anjou (Philip V). After the Treaty of Utrecht, Catalonia prolonged its resist-
ance for 14 more months under a republican government. At the end of the war, the victors imposed repression, exile and 
the end to the Catalan constitutions.
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The history of the Catalan-speaking lands (and the 
Kingdom of Aragon) singles out the end of the War of the 
Spanish Succession as a true turning point. Prior to the 
war, the kingdoms within the Crown of Aragon had de-
veloped their own legislation and political life. This proc-
ess was not halted with either the merger of the crowns 
which dynastically linked Aragon and Castile in the late 
15th century or the formation of the composite Habsburg 
monarchy. Quite the contrary, throughout the 16th and 
17th centuries the different states within the Crown of 
Aragon underwent institutional development character-
ised by the extension of social and territorial representa-
tion and an increase in the competences and fiscal 
resources of their representative or parliamentary institu-
tions. In parallel, especially starting in the last few decades 
of the 16th century, these institutions forged their own 
legal-political discourse, a process that was particularly 
intense in Catalonia. However, this tendency suddenly 
ground to a halt with Catalonia’s defeat in the War of the 
Spanish Succession. The new Bourbon order, cemented 
with the Nueva Planta decrees, led to the imposition of a 
newly-minted absolutist regime. In this article, we shall 
analyse the Catalan-speaking lands’ involvement in the 
Spanish War of Succession, focusing especially on the fac-
tors that led to their engagement in war and the conse-
quences brought about by their defeat.*
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The Crown of Aragon and the Spanish 
monarchy: An historical perspective
The merger of the crowns, sealed with the marriage 
of Ferdinand II of Catalonia and Aragon to Isabel I of 
Castile in 1469, preserved the political and institutional 
sovereignty of the kingdoms. Only foreign affairs (diplo-
macy and/or warfare) came to depend on the higher in-
stance, which the other Courts labelled the Spanish or 
Catholic monarchy. As several authors have pointed out, 
the merger of the crowns followed the Catalan-Aragonese 
model of confederation, as opposed to the Castilian ver-
sion, which pursued a more standardising, assimilating 
model.1 This was coupled with the essentially pactist Cata-
lan-Aragonese political model, in contrast to the funda-
mentally authoritarian model of the Castilian government.
Thus, the constitutional regime deployed successively 
in Catalonia until 1714 included such guarantees as the 
full legislative and fiscal sovereignty of the General Court 
or Parliament; judicial sovereignty expressed through the 
Audiencia (or Tribunal) of Catalonia; and the existence of 
an arbitrating institution, the Tribunal de Contrafaccions 
or Constitutional Tribunal, whose composition was 
equally divided between the king and the local institu-
tions “of the land”. This tribunal resolved institutional 
conflicts, claims against actions by the authorities deemed 
unconstitutional and other similar grievances. These in-
stitutions and the legal practices derived from them were 
grounded on a longstanding juridical-political literature 
which had yielded fully consolidated political values, the 
most important of which were the characterisation of 
sovereignty as a pact between the king and “the land” 
(pactism); the supremacy of the law, to which govern-
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ments, rulers and even the monarchy itself had to submit; 
and as a rather original feature of the country, control 
over the revenues and expenditures of the state taxation 
authority by the representative institutions of the branch-
es or institutions (and notably by the General Deputation, 
or Generalitat de Catalunya).2
Only a full awareness of the Generalitat’s political and 
fiscal power enables us to grasp the key role played by this 
institution in the revolutionary events of 1640, 1705 and 
1713.  
For its part, the Kingdom of Aragon initially had even 
broader leeway in its political sovereignty. This fact was 
driven home by the celebrated formula with which the 
Aragonese Court pledged loyalty to the monarch: the 
Aragonese branches or institutions stated that that “we 
are worth as much as you are, and together more than 
you”, before recognising the monarch as “our king and 
lord”. However, the Aragonese foral regime was substan-
tially amended by the Court of 1592, called by Philip II 
after his troops had put down the revolt of the kingdom. 
Likewise, despite the fact that the Kingdom of Valencia 
had a foral political system rooted in pactism, the mon-
arch’s competences there were always quite extensive. 
Even clearer is the case of the Kingdom of Majorca, the 
only kingdom that did not have its own general Court. 
The monarch’s more sweeping influence in Valencia and 
Majorca had a clear cause: unlike Aragon and Catalonia, 
which were constituent kingdoms of the Crown of 
Aragon, Valencia and Majorca were consecutive and 
therefore conquered kingdoms. This determined their 
legal status, as it did in the Kingdom of Sardinia, the oth-
er state linked to the Crown of Aragon in the modern 
age.
However, the leeway of the representative institutions 
in Catalonia was substantially curtailed after the Catalan 
Revolt or Reapers’ War (1640-1659).3 With the Spanish 
troops permanently occupying Barcelona (1652), Philip 
IV reserved several important competences for himself. 
Two in particular deserve mention: control of the lists 
of “insaculats” or people electable by lottery from the 
Generalitat and the Consell de Cent (Council of One Hun-
dred, or municipal government), and military control of 
the city (walls, the fortress on Montjuïc, etc.). Only with an 
awareness of how the land was militarily and politically 
controlled is it possible to grasp the country’s institutions’ 
lack of response to the signing of the Treaty of the Pyr-
enees between Philip IV and Louis XIV (1659). As is well-
known, this treaty meant the division of Catalonia and the 
annexation of its northern part (the counties of Roussillon 
and the French Cerdagne) to the Kingdom of France.
International war and internal revolt
During the Reign of Charles II (1665-1700), France de-
ployed an extremely active military and diplomatic policy 
aimed at influencing the succession in the Spanish king-
doms. The consecutive pacts signed with other European 
states to divide the Spanish monarchy were accompanied 
by an increasingly direct and vast influence in the Madrid 
Court, as well as warring episodes in which France dem-
onstrated its military superiority, such as the Nine Years’ 
War (1689-1697). In this dispute, France’s troops occu-
pied Catalonia once again, while its armada took over the 
Mediterranean coast and bombarded strategic locations 
such as Alicante.4
Outside the Francophile party in the Madrid Court, 
public opinion in the different Spanish kingdoms could 
not welcome the choice of a French candidate as their 
sovereign with open arms. And yet, this is what can be 
deduced from Charles II’s will. It should be borne in 
mind that the hostility between the Spanish monarchy 
and France had been constant throughout the previous 
two centuries. And the same could be said of the rivalry 
between the Austrians and the Bourbons, and two dynas-
ties that vied for European hegemony throughout the en-
tire 17th century. To some extent, after Westphalia 
(1648), the ascent of one of Louis XIV’s direct descend-
ants onto the Spanish throne cemented the definitive vic-
tory of both France and the Bourbons in that drawn-out 
conflict.
Figure 1. Minutes of the General Court held in Barcelona between 
12th October 1701 and 14th January 1702 chaired by King Philip 
IV and V of Spain in Catalonia. (National Library of Catalonia)
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Thus, the first few steps of the exceedingly young Philip 
of Anjou’s reign as Philip V of Spain inspired respect but 
not enthusiasm. This was homogeneous, widespread con-
duct in all the kingdoms, and in Catalonia as well, where 
as is known the new king called the General Court (1701), 
swore his oath to the constitutions and granted major 
economic and political concessions.5
A reflection on the period from 1700 to 1705 is particu-
larly interesting. Those years witnessed a leap from more 
or less widespread yet disorganised and demobilised anti-
French sentiment to the formation of a true Austriacist 
party which advocated the downfall of the monarch and 
his replacement with Archduke Charles of Austria, whose 
Spanish followers called him Charles III. This leap, it 
should be recalled, took place under the most clandestine 
of circumstances.
The Austriacist literature, both from the early days and 
the body produced in exile after defeat, stresses the inter-
nal causes of this change in attitude. Castilian Austria-
cism, little known even today, underscored the fact that 
the change in dynasty represented the submission of what 
used to be a major power to France. Therefore, the en-
thronement of Philip V would signal the nadir of Spanish 
decline. The argument also had an economic facet, as the 
Spanish pro-Austrian propaganda recalled French com-
panies’ monopolistic dominance in the Spanish-Ameri-
can trade, especially in the slave trade, after the enthrone-
ment of Philip V. The reduction of the old monarchy to 
the status of colony that these writings state would be 
driven home by the replacement of the former Castilian 
ruling class by French civil servants and courtiers. All of 
these arguments are already present in the manifesto 
signed in Lisbon in 1702 by the Admiral of Castile, Juan 
Tomás Enríquez de Cabrera, the first prominent figure 
from Spain who chose exile and direct confrontation with 
the Bourbons. It can be recovered almost literally in the 
political speech Teatro de desdichas (Theatre of Misfor-
tunes) published in the Milanese exile in 1716.6 
Catalan Austriacism, which was capable of generating 
its own discourse continuously throughout the entire 
war, also stressed the internal causes of the rupture. This 
discourse was particularly developed by Narcís Feliu de la 
Penya, an early Austriacist who was imprisoned by the 
Bourbon police in 1704. In 1709, he published the Anales 
de Cataluña (Annals of Catalonia), which can be regarded 
as the official history of Catalonia under the Archduke. 
The author devotes much of the third volume to describ-
ing the process of how relations between the Catalans and 
Philip V deteriorated. In fact, the chapters in this work 
explain how the events after the death of Charles II met 
with the ire of the Bourbon authorities in 1714, who then 
ordered the mass destruction.7
However Feliu, and with him Catalan Austriacism, de-
veloped their own line of argumentation. The goal was to 
describe the litany of complaints, abuses, unconstitution-
al deeds and similar grievances that had characterised the 
behaviour of Philip V and his ministers during the year 
prior to the 1705 uprising. More or less implicitly, the lit-
any of disloyal acts committed by the monarch would 
have invalidated the oath of loyalty that Catalonia had 
sworn to the General Court in 1701 and thus legitimised 
the rupture. This argument, incidentally, invalidated the 
accusations of rebellion that the Bourbon propaganda in-
cessantly repeated.
A careful reading of the text by Feliu, not only a 
firsthand witness of the events but also an active partici-
pant in them, shows, at least until 1704, a kind of sporadic 
conflict not unlike the ones that the institutions “of the 
land” and the royal viceroys had experienced in the previ-
ous reigns.8 It is true that from the start there were rea-
sons for tension between the Crown and the representa-
tive institutions, and most notably with the Council of 
One Hundred and the military (a corporation made up of 
the nobility and citizens headquartered in Barcelona). 
However, it is also true that the dynamics of both sides 
took place in the shadow of a dynastic dispute that had 
not yet taken on an explicit form.
We must examine the extremely meagre clandestine 
political texts from that early period in order to ascertain 
that the dynamic that led the Catalan-speaking lands – and 
all the Spanish kingdoms – to war took place in an inter-
national context.9 Here, too, however, there is another 
source that is particularly revealing, namely Francesc de 
Castellví’s Narraciones históricas (Historical Narrations). 
The author, a knight born in Montblanc (Conca de 
Barberà), one of the areas where Bourbon repression was 
extreme, was one of the earliest Austriacists; he partici-
pated in Barcelona’s last resistance and lived in a semi-
covert fashion in the first post-war period. In 1726, one 
year after the Peace of Vienna, which would lead to recip-
rocal amnesty for the followers of both Philip V and 
Charles III (then Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor), 
Castellví sought exile in the capital of the empire. There 
he spent the rest of his life – over 30 years until his death 
in 1757 – writing his monumental history of the war.10  
Castellví wrote from exile and defeat, without either 
the urgency or the dissimulations of one who feels like an 
active stakeholder in the conflict. Furthermore, he did so 
with an unequivocal desire for objectivity and with out-
standing intellectual honesty, which makes his work ex-
ceptionally relevant. From this vantage point, without 
mincing his words Castellví describes the steps in the 
construction and spread of the Austriacist party, particu-
larly in Catalonia, as well as its link to the allied states 
from the very outset. What is more, the author from 
Montblanc allows himself to mention Feliu’s Annals on 
several occasions, separating out what he reveals from 
what he conceals. This exercise in intellectual honesty 
goes so far as to shed light on certain attitudes present in 
the initial Bourbon repression, which reflected the grow-
ing dimensions of the Austriacist threat.
The allied powers’ key role in shaping the Austriacist 
rise is also a crucial factor in two important political texts 
published in 1734-1736 in the context of a new interna-
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tional conflict (the War of the Polish Succession), which 
seemed to breathe new life into the claims for a fair solu-
tion for the “case of the Catalans”. These works are Via 
fora als adormits (roughly, A Call to Action for the Peo-
ple), a lengthy political leaflet that was published in two 
versions, Catalan and French; and Record de l’Aliança fet 
al sereníssim Jordi, augusto rei de la Gran Bretaña (Re-
membrance of the Alliance made with the Most Serene 
Highness George, August King of Great Britain), which 
was printed in a bilingual Catalan and Latin edition. The 
main gist of both texts was to blame the allied states, espe-
cially England, for the Catalan uprising and to demand 
that they satisfy the debt incurred with Catalonia as part 
of the foreseeable new peace treaties.11
In short, the external explanation of the War of the 
Spanish Succession as a civil war underscores the origins 
and international dimension of the conflict at the outset. 
It is a fairly well-known historical sequence, although not 
always sufficiently valued by romantic Catalan and Span-
ish historiographies: the formation of the Great Alliance of 
The Hague (1701); the declaration of war in the Bourbon 
states of Spain and France (1702); the proclamation 
of Archduke Charles as King of Spain under the name of 
Charles III in Vienna (1703); the Alliance’s entry into 
Savoy and Portugal that same year; and Charles III’s ar-
rival in Lisbon and the onset of the peninsular hostilities 
(1704). Every single one of these events was accompanied 
by allied victories and non-defeats on the continent’s bat-
tlefields, and they triggered the fairly widespread impres-
sion that the Austriacist cause was ultimately destined to 
prevail. It was in this climate of expectation, and ultimate-
ly of euphoria, that the Austriacist party gestated and 
grew.
The international dimension in the first rumblings of 
civil war is driven home by the most probable etymologi-
cal origin of the word botifler, a highly derogatory term 
used in all the Catalan-speaking lands quite early on (it is 
documented as far back as 1702), which Charles’ follow-
ers used to call Bourbon supporters. According to Castellví, 
yet also according to the Valencian botiflers Isidre Planes 
and Josep Vicent Ortí i Major,12 the word is a parodical or 
comical twist on the surname of Marshal Boufflers, who 
led the French army in several battles in 1702 and 1703. 
Since its outcome was uncertain, whoever spread news 
favourable to the Bourbons was called a botifler, just as 
those who did the same in favour of the allies were 
known as imperials. As is known, that word loomed 
over Philip V’s followers during the war and throughout 
the lengthy post-war period. In fact, it is still a pejorative 
concept often used in Catalan political jargon today to 
refer to Catalans propounding submission to Spanish 
centralism.
If we recapitulate the above, we will realise that the Cat-
alan-speaking lands’ involvement in the War of the Span-
ish Succession had deep-seated internal causes, yet it 
would have also been impossible without the outbreak of 
international war. The Catalans could not look favoura-
bly upon a dynasty that had consolidated its power on the 
basis of political uniformism and absolutism, even less so 
when they had just witnessed, recently in historical terms, 
the northern Catalan-speaking counties’ process of vio-
lent assimilation, as well as the disasters of the recent mili-
tary occupations in the Principality, as Southern Catalonia 
was called. In this context, the sympathies of the Catalan 
ruling core inevitably had to seek other horizons: either 
the composite monarchy of the German Hapsburgs, 
who guaranteed, in acceptable enough terms for the day 
and age, respect for the diverse historical and identity 
realities; or the parliamentary and economically open 
models of England and the United Provinces of the 
Netherlands.
However, the war would not have broken out in 
Catalonia without the existence of its first international 
episodes, or without the conviction among a large swath 
of the ruling class that victory was possible.
From this twofold perspective, then, the case of the 
Catalans was perfectly comparable to that of other na-
tions or collectives who had historical grievances with 
the state structure under which they fell or to which they 
were subjugated. They include the Scottish Jacobites, 
who were against the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and 
the 1707 Act of Union but were ultimately aided by 
France; the Hungarian malcontents opposed to the rising 
Germanisation of the land, yet also financed from Paris; 
and the French Protestant camisards, reduced to Catho-
lic uniformism with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes 
decreed by Louis XIV, yet who nonetheless enjoyed the 
political and fiscal support and supervision of the Eng-
lish Whigs.13
In any event, Austriacism grew as a clandestine politi-
cal option in all the Spanish kingdoms thanks to the two-
fold stimulus of internal structural conflicts and external 
pressure. In Castile, it quite likely managed to encompass 
much broader middle-class and aristocratic swaths of so-
ciety than those who ended up supporting it explicitly. In 
Valencia, it spread among the peasants, who had recently 
been defeated in the uprising known as the Segona Ger-
mania (Second Brotherhood); yet it also received much 
more obvious support among the bourgeoisie of Valencia 
and other cities in the kingdom than what had been 
thought up to a few decades ago.14 In some cities, such as 
Alcoy, the war paralleled local feuds between families 
who were vying for hegemony.15 The commercial inter-
ests of an Anglophile bourgeoisie also explain the choice 
in favour of the allies by Cartagena, in the Kingdom of 
Murcia, the area that was the most explicitly favourable to 
the allies within the Crown of Castile.
Also at this point we are more familiar with the cir-
cumstances in the Principality. In Catalonia, the Austra-
cist party grew and even achieved clear social hegemony 
over a threefold foundation.16 First, Austriacism rose in 
strength among the military leaders who organised the 
popular resistance to the French invasions along the 
Vic-Ripoll axis in the second half of the 17th century. 
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They included petty nobles and landowners who be-
came the leaders of their local communities and led the 
irregular corps of riflemen, musketeers and militiamen. 
In fact, they were the vigatans, a blanket term to describe 
the entire anti-Bourbon resistance in Catalonia. This 
group maintained close ties to the German Prince 
George of Hessen-Darmstadt, the hero of the Catalan 
resistance against the French troops during the Nine 
Years’ War and the last viceroy of Charles II who was 
later sent into exile by Philip V; he played a crucial role 
in the formation of the Great Alliance of The Hague. 
The vigatans were, in fact, the armed wing of the Aus-
triacist party in Catalonia.
However, the hardcore of Catalan Austriacism was made 
up of Barcelona’s commercial bourgeoisie. In the sphere 
of what Narcís Feliu de la Penya defined using the metaphor 
of the Fénix de Cataluña (Phoenix of Catalonia),17 diverse 
merchant and industrial sectors drew up a model of eco-
nomic development that aspired to turn Catalonia into 
“the Holland of the Mediterranean”. This bourgeoisie, 
which was open to the new times, spread its influence 
over the entire land through urban networks, and in the 
context of war created a host of commercial enterprises 
for export, such as the Companyia Nova de Gibraltar.18 
The new urban ruling class also generated new realms of 
cultural production, such as the Acadèmia dels Desconfi-
ats (Academy of the Doubters),19 and collectives that were 
engaged in the new political dynamics, especially clear to-
day in the realm of notaries.20 In that context, the Univer-
sity of Barcelona became a key enclave in the subversive 
dynamic, which encompassed both students and profes-
sors.
The third leg on which anti-Bourbon resistance was 
propped up was the lower clergy, especially the mendi-
cant religious orders. This group, which was highly popu-
lar among the people, played a pivotal role in the events of 
1705 and of 1713-1714.
In its best-known guise, Catalan Austricism construct-
ed a political discourse grounded on the defence of 
pactism and the constitutions. It granted a crucial role to 
the institutions “of the land”, usually with regard to both 
their competences and their rising social and territorial 
representativeness. In its more radical formulations, 
Catalan Austricism fell within republicanism, viewed as a 
current that placed the common good as a supreme value 
over strictly dynastic considerations.21 In turn, Castilian 
Austriacism, which has yet to be studied in depth, devel-
oped a discourse grounded on upholding a monarchy 
“moderated” by the laws of the country and the intermedi-
ary role of the nobility and the Church.22 A pacted monar-
chy in Catalonia and a “moderated” monarchy in Castile 
both contrasted to the absolute monarchy put into place 
by the first Bourbon. In both movements, opposition to 
France and all that it meant in political and economic 
terms was also a core argument. As we can see, then, in 
neither case did the War of the Spanish Succession have an 
exclusively dynastic meaning on the peninsula.
From the failed disembarkation to the 
successful disembarkation (1704-1705)
Along with the social and ideological characterisation of 
Austriacism, we should also bear in mind its generational 
composition. Generally speaking, until at least 1704, 
those committed to the anti-Bourbon opposition were 
young adults who lacked a significant presence in the 
country’s governing institutions. This became crystal 
clear with the allied disembarkation in Barcelona on the 
28th of May of the same year.
It is quite clear that this enterprise had the support of a 
conspiracy inside the city. Yet it is also evident that when 
the time came, it was a feeble and immature undertaking. 
The institutions “of the land”, namely the Generalitat and 
the Council of One Hundred, were placed at the service of 
the Duke of Velasco, the viceroy of Catalonia for Philip V. 
And the Coronela, or urban militia, played a key role in 
the defence of the city. The allied troops were forced to 
leave post-haste. However, it should be noted that several 
hundred members of the conspiracy took advantage of 
that juncture to leave Barcelona and embark on the fleet 
that would conquer Gibraltar weeks later. This first group 
of Catalan exiles travelled to Lisbon, yet smaller numbers 
of them also went to Gibraltar, Genoa (a neutral republic 
and by definition a den of spies from both sides) and even 
Vienna. The presence of a significant number of exiles ex-
panded the resistance’s international contacts, as well as 
the network through which allied correspondence could 
arrive.
In any event, the failed disembarkation and the convic-
tion that there was an internal conspiracy triggered heavy 
repression in both Barcelona and Catalonia as a whole. 
On this point, it is interesting to contrast the sources from 
Catalonia and from the Court. To wit, according to Narcís 
Feliu de la Penya, it is clear that the repression spearhead-
ed by the viceroy Duke of Velasco was unprecedented in 
both its scope and the means it used. To the contrary, the 
Madrid sources tended to accuse Velasco of being too soft 
and incapable of handling the uprising.
In reality, both perceptions are based on one true point. 
In a complementary fashion, they indicate the qualitative 
leap in the clash between Catalonia and Philip V. This 
leap was characterised by the shift from traditional, spo-
radic and more or less corporate conflicts to new and 
more widely subversive behaviours, and especially by the 
massive use of certain public expressions of contempt for 
the order in power, such as the use of yellow bows, which 
became an emblem of Austriacism. The tide in favour of 
Charles III gradually came to conquer realms of expres-
sion and interaction, and in parallel, the so-called botiflers 
began to experience the strange sensation of being in the 
minority.
However not even under those circumstances did the 
most brazen Austriacists believe that any kind of popular 
revolt to oust the Bourbon would be possible. Quite the 
contrary, Austriacism, which was largely a by-product of 
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the international war as we have seen, needed the allies 
more than ever.
And by the end of 1704, this need was now mutual. The 
Great Alliance had been sustaining a war against the two 
Bourbon crowns for two long years in the name of a dy-
nastic dispute that had not given rise to major armed ex-
pressions in the country where, in theory, the grievance 
was supposed to be resolved. The activation of the Portu-
guese front with Charles III’s arrival in Lisbon had ended 
in utter failure. And the allies’ indisputable naval hegem-
ony on the Iberian coasts had only secured Gibraltar, 
which became like a presidium with its back turned on 
Figure 2. Map of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1706 (from Catalunya i la Guerra de Successió. Museu d’Història de Catalunya, 
Barcelona 2007).
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the hinterland. The allied failure in Spanish lands con-
trasted with the victorious dynamic of its troops on all 
other fronts.
All of these factors together can explain the overlap be-
tween the internal resistance and the allied states, the ut-
most expression of which was the signing of the Pact of 
Genoa on the 20th of June 1705. This pact, which com-
mitted England and the Catalan vigatans, expressed both 
sides’ long-term desire to reach an agreement. First, the 
ambassadors who signed on behalf of the internal resist-
ance shared their condition as exiles since 1704. Barcelona 
native Antoni de Peguera, then only 23 years old, had 
been one of the founders of the Acadèmia dels Desconfi-
ats. Domènec Perera, a lawyer, was a highly esteemed fig-
ure on the Vic plain. In turn, Queen Anne’s plenipotenti-
ary ambassador was Mitforde Crowe, a merchant who 
had done business in Catalonia, manufacturing and ex-
porting liquor. Thus, he fulfilled a twofold condition: he 
was familiar with the country and was well-known by 
much of the ruling class.
As if all this were not enough to inspire trust inside 
Catalonia, the pact guaranteed allied military support for 
a possible uprising. And, perhaps even more importantly 
for winning over Catalan public opinion, it guaranteed 
Figure 3. Map of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1706-1715 (from Catalunya i la Guerra de Successió. Museu d’Història de Catalunya, 
Barcelona 2007).
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England’s commitment to uphold Catalonia’s constitu-
tions, regardless of the outcome of the dispute.
The crucial importance of the pact was confirmed by 
immediate events. On the 20th of June, the vigatans won 
the Congost from the Bourbon troops and wrested con-
trol of the county of Osona along the course of the Besòs 
River, one of the main supply routes to Barcelona. One 
month later, on the 22nd of August, a large allied fleet dis-
embarked before the city. One of its passengers was Arch-
duke Charles of Austria, Charles III. Throughout the 
month and a half long siege, the resistance played a key 
role both at the gateways of Barcelona and in spreading 
the uprising around the country. However, at this point 
we cannot accept Narcís Feliu de la Penya’s account word 
for word, as it has an undeniably agitating tone, as proven 
by Josep M. Torras.23  
The allied success in Barcelona was accompanied by 
the triumph of the “maulets”, or Valencian Austriacists, 
in an operation that was most likely only designed as a 
military distraction: on the 10th of August, just a few days 
before the disembarkation in Barcelona, the allied fleet 
had disembarked a small contingent fleet of men off the 
coast of Altea, in the southern portion of the Kingdom of 
Valencia. It was commanded by the imperial officer Joan 
Baptista Basset i Ramos.24 Originally hailing from Valencia, 
Basset had forged his military career in the imperial army, 
where he stood out as an artilleryman, and he had accom-
panied the Prince of Hessen-Darmstadt in the negotiating 
process that led to the signing of the treaty of the Great 
Alliance. Endowed with a heavily populist character, Bas-
set won the support of the town of Dénia and afterwards a 
large number of Valencian peasants, whom he promised 
release from their feudal servitude.
With an essentially improvised army of the people, 
Basset won the backing of the Catalan troops under 
General Rafael Nebot, who had initially been charged 
with putting him down. However, his swift entry into the 
city of Valencia on the 16th of December also confirmed 
the scope of the conspiratorial circles inside the city. Just 
like in Barcelona, much of the Valencian bourgeoisie had 
already taken sides with the Archduke’s cause, including 
such major figures as Josep Vicent Torres Eiximeno, the 
secretary of the Municipal Council.
It is more difficult to ascertain the extent of the con-
spiracy within the nobility and the ecclesiastical hierar-
chy. The Count of Cardona, Josep Folch de Cardona i 
Erill, stood out for his defence of Charles III from the very 
start. However, his was a rather exceptional case. Cardona 
belonged to a side branch of the family line, and his ascent 
was inextricably linked to the Court of the Habsburgs, 
first in Madrid and later in Vienna. The stance in favour 
of Philip V was more frequent at first, although much of 
the Valencian nobility ended up shifting to back the 
Archduke’s cause during the second allied offensive on 
Madrid in 1710, including such prominent figures as Joan 
Basili de Castellví i Coloma, the Count of Cervelló, and 
the Archbishop of Valencia, Antoni Folch de Cardona. 
The change in sympathies might be put down to a twofold 
impetus from abroad. First, it is clear that in 1705 Basset’s 
anti-feudal discourse somewhat alienated some of the no-
bility that might initially have been leaning towards 
Charles III’s cause. Secondly, the abolition of the Furs de 
València (the laws of the Kingdom of Valencia) and the 
imposition of the laws of Castile in the kingdom in 1707, 
along with the extremely harsh repression exercised by 
the Bourbon troops, ended up conducting these sectors 
towards the Austriacist cause. 
The remaining territories in the Crown of Aragon, 
including the Kingdom of Aragon and the islands of 
Majorca, Ibiza and Sardinia, gradually proclaimed their 
support for the Archduke as the allied armies announced 
their presence. Therefore, we should understand that in 
all these realms the Austriacist cause earned widespread 
sympathy, but in none of them was it powerful enough to 
devolve into subversion. The only exception to this dy-
namic was Minorca. However, the unilateral proclama-
tion of Charles as king in 1706 was put down by the Janu-
ary 1707 Bourbon occupation, which shortly thereafter 
abolished the island’s privileges. Minorca was won back 
by allied troops in late September 1708.
The active or passive Austriacism of the kingdoms in 
the Crown of Aragon contrasts with the clearly predomi-
nant support for Philip among the people of Castile. This 
stance became particularly clear during the two allied oc-
cupations of Madrid in 1706 and 1710. Although on both 
occasions the Bourbon authorities imprisoned aristocrats 
and bishops who had been accused of collaborating with 
Charles III, the Austracists’ capacity for mobilisation was 
quite flimsy and Philip V’s cause even won support as a 
result of these deeds. This reality unquestionably con-
trasts with Castilian Austriacism’s early and major pres-
ence in powerful nuclei until then.
The key to this paradox may be found once again in the 
arguments used by the propagandists. As M. Teresa Pérez 
Picazo has pointed out, the Castilian Bourbon texts 
heightened their xenophobic discourse at these junctures, 
painting the allied army as a conglomerate made up of 
Protestants and enemies of Spain. In this overall context, 
Catalanophobia took on particular pride of place, espe-
cially in the texts addressed to the common people.25
In fact, this discourse was anything but new. It was even 
predicted by the Admiral of Castile in Lisbon when talk 
began of a probable allied disembarkation in Barcelona. 
The chroniclers on both sides dovetail on this point. The 
Sardinian pro-Philip historian Vicenç Bacallar, Marquis 
of San Felipe, puts the following words into the Admiral’s 
mouth: “el golpe mortal para la España era atacar la An-
dalucía, porque nunca obedecería Castilla a rey que en-
trase por Aragón, porque ésta era la cabeza de la Monar-
quía”.26 And Francesc de Castellví himself confirmed the 
sense of the Admiral’s statement: “Que, dirigiéndose las 
armas a Cataluña, esto haría más pertinaces las Castillas, 
que juzgarían presumía la Corona de Aragón darles ley; 
[...] que si el rey entraba por Andalucía a ocupar Madrid se 
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mantendría en el reino, y que si se intentaba por las partes 
de Aragón y Valencia no permanecería en España”.27
Charles III, King of the Catalans: Politics 
and war
The international war also became a civil war on the 7th 
of November 1705, the date of Charles III’s triumphal en-
try into Barcelona. Two young foreign princes set up their 
parallel courts in Madrid and Barcelona, with a govern-
ment structure made up of councils and secretaries that 
tended to be carbon copies of each other.28
Just like his ancestor and rival, Charles called the Gen-
eral Court of Catalonia and proved himself particularly 
generous with it. Not only did he repeat some of the main 
economic concessions (direct trade with America, the 
duty-free port of Barcelona) and political concessions 
(such as the creation of the Constitutional Tribunal) 
granted by the first Spanish Bourbon, he also added new 
ones, including the abolition of royal control over the bal-
lot voting of the Generalitat and the Council of One Hun-
dred, which de facto erased the last major repressive con-
sequence of the 1640 revolution. Along the same lines, 
worth highlighting is the legalisation of the Conferència 
dels Tres Comuns (Conference of the Three Commons), 
which encompassed these two institutions and the mili-
tary wing. This association of institutions had been ex-
plicitly banned by Philip V, and it would come to play a 
pivotal role in the last defence of Barcelona during the 
siege of 1713-1714.
All of this was joined by a deliberate policy of promot-
ing local Austriacism in society through ennoblements, 
concessions to honourable citizens, titles and civilian and 
military appointments. Therefore, we could say that in 
the spring of 1706, once Barcelona overcame the first 
Bourbon siege, the Austriacist party consolidated its vic-
tory in the spheres of the military, ideas and individuals.
However, the day-to-day operation of the new regime 
was anything but smooth. The tensions between the 
Crown and the institutions “of the land” reappeared 
quickly and became especially palpable starting in late 
1707, when the war definitively reached Catalonia with 
the Bourbon occupation of Lleida. In that context, the 
Court managed to generate projects with an authoritarian 
or absolutist bent. In any event, it is impossible to draw 
conclusions about how Charles’ court would have evolved 
had the conflict ended differently. In this sense, we should 
bear in mind that the government of Barcelona was per-
manently affected by the war, which conferred on it an 
ongoing temporary status.
This status of exceptionalness was experienced on a 
twofold level. First, Barcelona not only remained the cap-
ital of the Principality, rather it also suddenly became the 
capital of a parallel court, where the entire architecture of 
the councils characteristic of the Spanish Habsburgs was 
set up in a more or less improvised or imperfect way. Su-
perimposed on them were two secretaries of state: the one 
held by Catalan notary Ramon de Vilana-Perles (who had 
become the Marquis of Rialb) with competences around 
the entire peninsula, and the one for Italy, entrusted to 
Navarra native Juan Antonio Romeo, Marquis of Eren-
dazu. Thus, it is worth stressing that theoretically these 
bodies governed lands that had never been in Charles’ 
hands, or were so during an exceptionally brief period of 
time. This meant a clear drain on the treasury and there-
fore political and military dependency on the allied states.
This exceptionalness was also caused by the vicissi-
tudes of the war. Unlike both Bourbon crowns, which had 
territorial continuity and clear leadership by French offi-
cialdom, the allied army on the peninsula was always a 
heterogeneous amalgam. Out of the entire set of diverse 
forces – imperial, British, Dutch, Portuguese and even 
Spanish troops recruited by Charles III – the British pres-
ence became pivotal, among other reasons because they 
were the only ones who had a large enough armada to 
move troops. And the British military campaigns were 
marked by the need to convince a public opinion that was 
internally highly divided. This quite likely explains the 
obsession with entering Madrid – that is, with garnering 
favourable headlines in the sympathetic English propa-
ganda - which guided the operations of 1706 and 1710, 
and ultimately made them fail.
Despite all of these factors, during the period from 
1705 to 1713, Barcelona experienced the social and sym-
bolic mirage of being a royal court, a circumstance that 
we would have to go back more than two centuries to find 
again. Ambassadors and representatives of all the allied 
and neutral states flocked to Barcelona, along with mer-
chants from all over the world, the traditional nobility 
from Spain and Italy and the new nobility ensconced by 
the new monarch. The city also welcomed prominent art-
ists whose arrival had immediate repercussions in the 
realms of architecture, theatre and music.29 Likewise, it 
also launched ambitious trade projects that sought over-
seas markets, such as the aforementioned Companyia 
Nova de Gibraltar, founded in 1709.30  And at all scales, 
one can sense a certain process of fusion between the new 
arrivals and the locals which would continue in the ensu-
ing years in the Viennese exile.
However, the military dynamic on the Iberian Penin-
sula always fared poorly. The first offensive on Madrid 
ended up with the allied defeat in the Battle of Almansa 
(1707). This had vast political repercussions, as it meant 
the relegation of the war to Catalonia and the publication 
of the decree abolishing the laws of the kingdoms of 
Aragon and Valencia. The most prominent Austriacists 
in these two kingdoms had to take refuge in Barcelona, 
while the new Bourbon authorities embarked on massive 
repression characterised by collective punishment, mass 
executions and the burning of what were considered rebel 
strongholds. In the end, Charles III’s rule in Valencia had 
not even lasted a year and a half – several months longer 
than in Aragon.
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the republican period
However, Charles III lost the war not on the Iberian front 
but in international diplomacy. As is well known, on the 
11th of April 1713 the Treaty of Utrecht was signed, 
putting an end to the international war. Almost one 
month earlier, on the 19th of March, his wife Elizabeth 
Christina had set sail from Barcelona to the empire in the 
company of some of the most conspicuous members of 
the court. Article 13 of the treaty recognised the efforts of 
Queen Anne of England to guarantee that the constitu-
tions of Catalonia were upheld (although it did not ex-
plicitly mention the Pact of Genoa signed with the Cata-
lans in 1705). However, the Queen was satisfied with 
Philip V’s pledge to guarantee the Catalans the “privileges 
held by the inhabitants of both Castiles, who of all the 
peoples of Spain are the ones that love the Catholic King 
the best”. It goes without saying that this text endorsed, 
albeit with an undeniable measure of cynicism, the desire 
of the first Spanish Bourbon to abolish the constitutions 
of Catalonia.31
The withdrawal of allied troops was accompanied by 
the parallel advance of the army of the two crowns. This 
practice, agreed upon by the top military authorities in 
the Convention of Hospitalet (22nd of June), had only 
three exceptions: the garrisons at the forts of Castellciutat 
and Cardona, governed respectively by Generals Josep 
Moragues and Manuel Desvalls, and especially Barcelona. 
In the capital of Catalonia, the chief councillor was in 
charge, on behalf of the city, of the fortress on Montjuïc 
and the Drassanes shipyards, where the allied army’s mu-
nitions and war materiel were kept. This latter act, which 
was clearly groundbreaking, would mark the subsequent 
events.32
Indeed, while General Starhemberg, the last viceroy of 
Catalonia, completed the withdrawal of the imperial 
troops, the General Deputation called the Junta General 
de Braços de Catalunya, in agreement with the two other 
commons. This institution, which was also known then as 
the Parliament of Catalonia, had even greater social and 
territorial representation than the General Court, from 
which it differed by the absence of the monarch. In fact, 
the Junta General had only been called on one other occa-
sion, in 1641, a juncture also characterised by rupture and 
war.
The Junta was officially constituted on the 30th of June 
1713, and it was organised into separate meetings of the 
wings or branches. The debate was extremely heated in 
the military and royal branches, as the ecclesiastic branch 
chose not to take part in the voting. The terms that were 
discussed were surrender or resistance. To support the 
former, such obvious arguments were wielded as the in-
evitability of defeat and the need to avoid bloodshed and 
the ruin of the country. The second option appealed to 
the pride and history of the fatherland, to the irreversibil-
ity of the loss of the constitutions and even to the possibil-
ity that the international situation might change in the 
forthcoming months. Based on this argumentation, re-
sistance became a tactic dictated by political prudence, at 
least in the early stages. Thanks to Francesc de Castellví, 
we still have the speeches delivered in the military branch, 
all of them rhetorically effective and boasting undeniable 
political eloquence.33
Everything leads us to believe that the majority of those 
attending the Junta de Braços advocated surrender. A 
preliminary text along these lines was drawn up on behalf 
of the equitable representation of all three branches. 
However, on the 9th of July the General Deputation pub-
licised the Junta’s agreement to resist. This came as a great 
surprise not only to the European chancelleries, begin-
ning with the imperial chancellery, but also to a broad 
swath of Catalan public opinion. It was the outcome of a 
variety of factors: the ecclesiastic branch’s decision not to 
take part in the voting, probably convinced of its outcome 
in favour of surrender; the steadfast preference for resist-
ance in the royal branch, made up of cities, towns and free 
places; and the presence of a highly vociferous, albeit 
probably minority, core of members of the military 
branch also leaning towards resistance, which forced a 
second vote after the cities and villages had chosen this 
option. We should also add the pressure from Barcelona’s 
lower echelons, which repeatedly, and even violently, 
threatened the sectors in favour of surrender, and which 
probably managed to ensure some nobles in favour of this 
option were absent from the city before the second and 
decisive vote in their branch. Conversely, also worth not-
ing is Starhemberg’s pressure on the wealthy sectors of 
society to accept what had been agreed to in Utrecht.
The army of the two crowns, commanded by the Duke 
of Pòpuli, encircled the city and ordered it to surrender 
on the 25th of July 1713. The forces were clearly ill-
matched. At the peak of the siege, the Bourbon troops 
managed to gather 100,000 men in Catalonia, half of 
whom were stationed around the city. In contrast, the de-
fensive forces were paltrier: around 2,000 professional 
soldiers led by General Antoni de Villarroel in Barcelona. 
There might have been slightly more mountain riflemen 
scattered around the country, which were joined by the 
garrisons in Castellciutat and Cardona, and around 5,000 
civilians, locals and refugees which made up Barcelona’s 
Coronela or urban militia, led by its chief councillor (Rafael 
Casanova, starting in November 1713).  
However, the city successfully resisted the first few 
months of the siege, even though it did not manage to 
spread this resistance to the land as a whole. The winter of 
1714, however, witnessed the spread of the revolt of the 
Quinzenades, named after the new tax introduced by the 
Bourbon authorities at the time.34 The repression of this 
movement was fierce, and it ended with a vast number of 
burned, devastated towns and massive, indiscriminate 
killings. Starting on the 22nd of May 1714, the Bourbon 
battery achieved positions that enabled them to launch 
the bombardments of Barcelona. The siege picked up mo-
mentum on the 6th of July, almost one year after it start-
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Figure 4 a,b,c. The Siege of Barcelona, 1714. Engravings by Jacint Rigaud (Historic Archive of the City of Barcelona)
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ed, as the Duke of Berwick and numerous French troops 
joined it. And as the history books all state, Barcelona fell 
on the 11th of September.
It is not our objective here to provide a detailed list of 
the military events that took place throughout those 14 
months,35 nor to examine their terrible influence on the ci-
vilian population, which is amply discussed by Francesc de 
Castellví. However, we would like to offer several reflec-
tions on the governance of the resistance during that peri-
od, a subject that we have analysed more extensively.36
The government of a kingless country inevitably took 
on a republican form.  It was structured by means of col-
legial organisations with a certain degree of organisation-
al complexity yet, as we have seen, which already had a 
longstanding tradition and numerous complicities. Thus, 
when the Junta General de Braços suspended its functions 
on the 16th of July 1713, it appointed a collegial board 
consisting of 36 members, 12 per branch, charged with 
leading the resistance on behalf of the official bodies. 
Worth pointing out is the executive, not merely consulta-
tive, nature of this board. Thus, even though the deputies 
of the General Deputation continued to have a protocol-
based presence within the institutions, the real power was 
harnessed through this extensive board. 
Likewise, the Conference of the Three Commons, 
made up of the Deputation, the Council of One Hundred 
and the military wing, took charge of effectively govern-
ing the resistance. One of its first measures was to notify 
the viceroy of Majorca, Joan Antoni de Rubí i de Boixa-
dors, Marquis of Rubí, of the decision to put up resist-
ance. It also notified the Catalan ambassadors in the old 
allied courts who had been appointed by the Commons in 
the preceding months. Throughout the siege, the ambas-
sadors received instructions to seek a negotiated solution 
to the conflict; the speculations included the possibility of 
forming a “free republic” made up of Catalonia, Majorca 
and Ibiza under a British protectorate.
On the 26th of February 1714, the 36-member board 
was replaced by a 24-member board made up exclusively 
of members of the Council of One Hundred. As had al-
ready happened in the Reapers’ War, the enemy troops’ 
occupation of almost the entire country had left the Gen-
eral Deputation without revenue and with scant political 
representativeness. Just like then, the Council of One 
Hundred seized leadership of the last resistance. Yet it is 
worth pointing out that the Conference of the Three 
Commons continued to make all the important political 
decisions in a collegial fashion.
However, the government formed in July 1713 showed 
a special interest in maintaining the legality of a political 
system which was surmounted by a monarch, Charles III, 
on whose behalf the resistance had been proclaimed. In 
the absence of a viceroy in the wake of Starhemberg’s 
evacuation, the top representative of the monarch in the 
Principality was the spokesman for the general govern-
ance, Pere de Sentmenat-Torrelles, who stood in for the 
viceroy by performing his functions. The same can be 
said of the Audiencia or Tribunal of Catalonia, which was 
largely decimated due to the departure of some of its 
members to Mataró, a town under Bourbon control.
From Vienna, Charles played his hand, too. A key fig-
ure in this was the notary Joan Francesc de Verneda, the 
brother-in-law of Ramon de Vilana-Perles, who by then 
had been appointed the Secretary of State and Secretary of 
the Universal Office of the Council of Spain, with its 
headquarters in the capital of the empire. Verneda, who 
had left Catalonia in the entourage accompanying the 
empress Elisabeth Cristina in March 1713, returned to 
Barcelona on the 2nd of October of that same year. There-
after, he played the role of agent or official ambassador of 
the emperor-king in Barcelona. Through the viceroy of 
Majorca, Verneda kept the Council of Spain, and espe-
cially his brother-in-law Vilana-Perles, abreast of the 
course of events in Barcelona, and he received specific or-
ders of action from them.
The military rule of Barcelona was entrusted to a re-
stricted commission, called the Junta Secreta (Secret 
Board), which was made up of representatives of the 
Three Commons, the government spokesmen and Ver-
neda himself. The board met with the general governor, 
Antoni de Villarroel, who, at least since Verneda’s arrival, 
felt appointed by his king, Charles III.
Throughout the siege, the resistance organised sweep-
ing political propaganda. The most significant discourse 
along these lines was the Despertador de Catalunya 
(which can be roughly translated as Catalonia’s Wake-up 
Call). This text, published in Barcelona in November 
1713, was translated into Italian shortly thereafter and 
printed in Naples. Unlike the propaganda from 1705 to 
1706, which was more clearly dynastic in tone, the texts 
from the last siege of Barcelona stress republican values 
like the freedom of the homeland and the supremacy of 
the common good and the general interest. Likewise, it 
refuted the Bourbon propaganda, which painted the con-
stitutions of Catalonia as a set of archaic rights aimed ex-
clusively at the privileged sectors. In contrast to this vi-
sion, texts like the Despertador highlighted the vast 
number of rights – fiscal, juridical and many other kinds 
– that common Catalans enjoyed thanks to the legal sys-
tem, which was in danger of extinction at that time.37
Also worth highlighting is the publication of the Gase-
ta de Barcelona (Gazette of Barcelona) in the city, which 
released 42 issues between July 1713 and August 1714.38 
The purpose of this publication was to boost the morale 
of the besieged citizens and to counter the Bourbon 
propaganda.
The defence of the country soon took on guises of pop-
ular Catholic fervour as well, which gradually slipped to-
wards millenarianism throughout the months of the 
siege. The daily expressions of mass religiosity were 
spearheaded by members of the ordinary urban clergy, 
who some prominent leaders of the resistance derogato-
rily referred to as “holy men”. Some forms of popular de-
votion were halfway between civil and Catholic discours-
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es. The worship of Our Lady of Freedom was particularly 
popular and gave rise to several highly celebrated verses.
The repression and the Nueva Planta 
decrees
In Catalonia, the rout of 1715 only bears comparison with 
that of 1939. Everything points to the fact that the figures 
on retaliation, executions and exiles are somewhat inter-
changeable in proportion to the population in both years. 
Furthermore, in both cases, the qualitative consequences 
of the repression were even more pronounced, as it par-
ticularly affected the sectors which, from a diverse social 
reality and throughout the entire land, had led a project 
for the country and for the future. Beyond the decapita-
tion of the leading class, the defeat on both dates also led 
to the end of Catalonia’s own legal-political organisation 
and the imposition of the model of state against which it 
had fought.
The regime that was set up in Catalonia in the months 
after the 11th of September has been described as military 
terrorism by several authors, starting with Salvador 
Sanpere i Miquel. In fact this model, characterised by in-
discriminate action and the utter impunity of army offi-
cials, had two immediate precedents. The first, as we 
mentioned above, was in Valencia, especially after the 
Battle of Almansa, and it led to the burning of numerous 
villages. The second took place in the Principality during 
the first few months of 1714, triggered by the revolt 
against the Quinzenades taxes. In both cases, the army re-
sorted to similar practices: indiscriminate collective pun-
ishment, mass executions of the resistance, military coer-
cion, requisitions, the imprisonment of local authorities 
and surcharges on neighbouring towns in the event of un-
paid taxes, in short, the abusive, ongoing practice of the 
pedagogy of state terror.
However, the spread of military terrorism over the en-
tire land was in no way the outcome of spontaneous or 
autonomous actions on the part of the army leaders. 
Quite the contrary, it was part of a meticulous plan which 
singled out and punished its victims at all times. Thus, the 
military and political leaders of Barcelona’s resistance 
during the 1713-1714 siege were arrested and sent to Ali-
cante, where they were distributed among the presidiums 
in Hondarribia, Pamplona and La Coruña. The majority 
were not released until 1725. Likewise, the officers and 
soldiers were either imprisoned closer to home, such as in 
Tortosa or Peníscola, or allowed to return to their towns 
and homes under the condition that they had to report to 
the Bourbon authorities periodically.39
Furthermore, several dozen churchmen were removed 
to lands under the jurisdiction of the emperor, especially 
in Italy or the Pontifical States. The same fate befell hun-
dreds of refugees from other Spanish kingdoms who had 
remained in Catalonia during the siege. This measure was 
even applied to those who took refuge in Mataró, which 
was under Bourbon domination, awaiting Philip V’s par-
don.
The policy of repression encompassed all spheres. The 
assets of the Austriacists were seized by the royal adminis-
tration. All the titles, posts and honours granted during 
the reign of Charles III were rescinded. This policy of 
erasing the historical memory become a primary objec-
tive which entailed the destruction of the symbols of both 
the distant and recent past, the total or partial prohibition 
of works published during the time of Charles III and rig-
id censorship of the chronicles from his day, which even 
prevented texts clearly in support of Philip V and hostile 
to his rivals from being disseminated in the Spanish mon-
archy.
The decrees banning weapons were applied across the 
board. In the majority of cities and towns in Catalonia, 
the army came to permanently occupy the most emblem-
atic and largest buildings. In Lleida, for example, it took 
over the Seu Vella, or old cathedral. In Barcelona, in addi-
tion to occupying Montjuïc, the city walls, the Drassanes 
shipyards, former convents like Sant Agustí and public 
buildings like the university on La Rambla dels Estudis, it 
also ordered the military Ciutadella (citadel) built, a work 
that, as Albert Garcia Espuche has pointed out, required 
more than 1,200 homes to be destroyed, that is, one-fifth 
of the homes in the entire city.40
All the universities were shuttered. In their place, a sin-
gle university was created in Cervera, a town with Bour-
bon leanings, which was placed under the supervision of 
the Company of Jesus. The Catalan language was gradu-
ally proscribed in all public realms, following the guide-
line expressed in an instruction to the magistrates in 1717: 
“may the effect be achieved without citizens noticing it”.
The Nueva Planta decree of Catalonia, dated the 16th 
of January 1716, was the last link in a chain of decrees that 
affected all the kingdoms within the Crown of Aragon. As 
discussed above, the first decree abolishing the furs (fuer-
os in Spanish) or laws was published in 1707, targeted at 
the kingdoms of Valencia and Aragon.41 In 1711, a new 
decree was issued for this latter kingdom, the former hav-
ing been rescinded during the allied offensive of 1710. 
The penultimate decree was published in the Kingdom of 
Majorca in 1715.
As Joan Mercader i Riba has pointed out,42 the text ap-
plied to Catalonia was the most elaborate and mature. The 
decree abolished all the representative institutions, both 
local and national. In their place, it proclaimed the abso-
lute power of the monarch, who exercised this power 
through three parallel hierarchical lines, organised from 
top to bottom. First, the Captain General became the 
prime authority in the Principality in the military and po-
litical sphere, although its main function over the century 
was to command the plethora of military forces stationed 
in Catalonia. Secondly, the Royal Tribunal, made up of 
two civilian tribunals and one criminal tribunal with a to-
tal of 16 judges, became the supreme tribunal and the po-
litical government of the Principality. The institution’s 
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confiscation of the House of the Deputies, or the Palace of 
the Generalitat, symbolises its rise to power. The Tribunal 
was the only institution where the Catalan botiflers had a 
strong showing. Even though it was formally subordinate 
to the Captain General, its natural president, it had greater 
institutional continuity and a great deal of political clout, 
as it controlled the network of magistrates and mayors 
who were in charge of public order in the local sphere. Fi-
nally, the Superintendency was charged with collecting the 
army’s and administration’s taxes and payments; it was 
organised throughout the territory by sub-delegations.
In a pyramidal system, all the political authorities in 
Catalonia, even the local ones, had to be directly appoint-
ed by the king or, in the case of lower-level authorities, by 
the Royal Tribunal.
The new political organisation was complemented by 
the new system of taxation. The Superintendency took 
care of all the ordinary taxes formerly paid to the monar-
chy as well as the taxes of the Generalitat and the Council 
of One Hundred. As mentioned above, it also kept the as-
sets seized from the Austriacists. It further created new 
indirect taxes and generated a new direct tax, the land 
register tax, published on the 9th of December 1715 and 
enforced starting in the following year.
From the start, the contributions to the land registry 
tax, along with other ancillary taxes, hovered at around 
one million pesos per year, which multiplied the value of 
the services voted in the last two convocations of the Gen-
eral Court of Catalonia 7.3 times.43 Its enforcement in a 
country that was financially ruined by the impact of wars 
was particularly burdensome and turned it into a de facto 
punishment for war. On the other hand, despite the fact 
that it was apparently equitable, several miscalculations 
in conception out of haste, coupled with the violence with 
which it was enforced, contributed to aggravating its con-
sequences. In many cases, it was only possible to enforce 
this tax by military confiscations and other repressive 
measures. In cases of default, surcharges on neighbouring 
towns were also common. For all of these reasons, the 
new tax won the popular epithet of “catastrophic”.
However, despite the spectacular rise in fiscal pressure, 
the military presence was so imposing throughout the 
century that the taxes paid by Catalonia did not even cov-
er the state’s expenses. Thus, in 1729 the Crown’s total 
revenues in Catalonia only accounted for 58.49% of the 
expenses of the occupying army and 49.8% of the monar-
chy’s total expenses in the Principality.
In short, despite the fact that the Nueva Planta decrees 
were theoretically supposed to lead to the spread of Cas-
tilian laws and institutions in Catalonia – in line with the 
commitment Philip V made in Utrecht – in reality what it 
introduced was essentially new. Thus, the concentration 
of power in the hands of the Captain General, the milita-
risation of the post of magistrate, the very existence of the 
Superintendency and the tax model were a radically abso-
lutist trial run which was only possible due to the condi-
tion of Catalonia as a vanquished land. When the monar-
chy tried to introduce the land registry tax in the Crown 
of Castile starting in 1745, it was met with widespread op-
position which required it to delay and ultimately table 
the project.
Exile and “persistent Austriacism”
One of the most important consequences of the War of 
the Spanish Succession was exile.44 The censuses drawn 
up after 1714 enable us to estimate the total number of 
exiles at between 25,000 and 30,000 people. The exiles in-
cluded people from all social strata and all the peninsular 
kingdoms, although the Catalans were the most promi-
nent group.
In fact, the exiles left in several different waves. The 
first was triggered by the July 1713 evacuation, when the 
majority of politicians and court nobles left Barcelona, as 
did a vast number of officers and soldiers with their fami-
lies. Once in Italy, they set up three cavalry and two infan-
try regiments. The second major wave was a direct conse-
quence of the 1714 defeat. The Cardona garrison left in an 
orderly fashion, as the capitulation of the fortress stipu-
lated the occupants’ right to be able to leave the country. 
It was joined by the groups that had been banished by the 
Bourbon authorities, namely ecclesiasts and natives of 
other kingdoms living in Catalonia during the siege. 
However, the largest group to go into exile, and the one 
that lasted the longest, was covert: the thousands of Cata-
lans who left the country in contravention of the law be-
cause their lives were endangered. This number was also 
enlarged by the Bourbon occupations of Majorca (1715) 
and Sardinia (1717) and the demobilisation of Carras-
quet’s soldiers after the War of the Quadruple Alliance 
(1720). The Peace of Vienna (1725), which formally end-
ed the war, stipulated reciprocal amnesty, whereupon the 
majority of officers who had been imprisoned since 1714 
chose to go into exile.
The exiles mainly settled in the Kingdom of Naples and 
the state of Milan. However, the nobility and the upper-
echelon functionaries ended up in Vienna. There in the 
capital of the empire they formed the Councils of Spain 
and Flanders, charged with governing the lands granted 
to the emperor in the Treaty of Utrecht. The majority of 
their councillors were exiles. Likewise, as Ernest Lluch re-
minds us,45 German historiography stresses the influence 
in the imperial milieu exerted by the so-called “Spanish 
party”, also made up of exiles and former members of the 
Court of Barcelona. In turn, many of the exiled ecclesiasts 
gathered in Rome. Those who lived in the emperor’s lands 
were generally given pensions or incomes in accordance 
with their previous social status.
Until well into the 1740s, the exiles everywhere re-
tained their identity traits and their own spheres of socia-
bility. In Vienna, the exiles frequented the Benedictine 
monastery of Montserrat (the Schwartzspanier, or Black 
Spaniards) and the convent of the Barefooted Trinitarians 
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(White Spaniards). The latter was finished in 1727, and its 
crypt still preserves the tombs of some of the most illustri-
ous exiles. The Hospital of the Spaniards was also created, 
which Castellví claimed tended to 2,427 patients between 
1718 and 1732. Its church, still operating today, was dedi-
cated to Our Lady of Mercy.
The five Spanish regiments and a company of volun-
teers participated actively in the Ottoman-Venetian War 
(1714-1718). In that conflict, the warring campaigns of 
1716 and 1717 led to the occupations of Temesvar and 
Belgrade, respectively, which were ratified by the Treaty 
of Passarowitz (1718). The Count of Alcaudete, Antonio 
de Portugal y Toledo, was in command of the attacking 
forces when both sites surrender and was consequently 
given the keys to the gateways of the walls, which in 
the ensuing years he sent to the Monastery of Guadalupe 
(Extremadura) along with two silver figures. Likewise, at 
that time Valencia native Vicent Díaz de Sarralde wrote 
an epic composition which he published in Naples.46
Major works of history and political thinking were 
written in exile. The most prominent figures include 
Francesc de Castellví, the author of the best Catalan 
chronicle of the war, which we have cited profusely; 
Antoni de Bastero, who published La Crusca Provenzale 
(Provençal Tuscan, 1724) in Rome, a study that upheld 
the influence of the Catalan and Provençal troubadours 
in the roots of the Trecento; Josep Plantí, author of several 
historical works and a project to create a new city for the 
exiles; Juan Amor de Soria, who drew up several extreme-
ly important political texts; and jurists Domènec Aguirre 
and Francesc Solanes, among others.47
Despite the ban on correspondence for lengthy periods 
of time, the exiles kept in political contact with the core of 
the resistance inside the country. The relationship was 
more intense during the large-scale international con-
flicts, which the exiles regarded as a platform for once 
again placing the “case of the Catalans” on the table. 
These circumstances arose during the War of the Quad-
ruple Alliance (1718-1720) and the ensuing Congress of 
Cambrai, and on the occasion of the War of the Polish 
Succession (1733-1735). As mentioned above, during this 
latter conflict, which ended with the Bourbon occupation 
of Naples and Sicily, two extremely important political 
works were published in exile: Via fora als adormits and 
Record de l’Aliança fet al sereníssim Jordi, augusto rei de la 
Gran Bretanya.48  
However, the Bourbon occupation of the southern Ital-
ian kingdoms had dire consequences for the exiles. The 
Council of Spain was closed, the pensions ceased to be 
paid and the empire agreed to move the group of pen-
sioners to lands in the Banat of Tenesvar, which at the 
time was undergoing active colonisation. Thus, around 
800 exiles were concentrated in what today is Zrenjanin 
(Vojvodina, Serbia), where they founded New Barcelona 
(1735-1738). The experiment ended in utter failure and 
an extremely high mortality rate. In the subsequent years, 
the survivors returned to Buda and Vienna.49
By the end of the 1740s, the exiles were clearly begin-
ning to disperse. This dispersion was compounded by the 
return to peninsular lands in some cases, and by deaths 
and dissolution into the host societies through mixed 
marriages in others.
In Catalonia, there were several groups which opposed 
the Bourbon occupation until the 1730s, obviously in a 
covert fashion. The guerrillas regained strength during 
the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720), which 
this time pitted the old allies and France against Philip V. 
In the summer of 1719, the guerrilla Pere Joan Barceló 
(“Carrasquet”), armed with French money and weapons, 
led a revolt in the southern counties of the Principality. 
Other leaders around Catalonia followed his example, as 
Enrique Giménez has pointed out.50 Likewise, in the 
Pyrenean villages occupied by the French troops, the re-
gime prior to the Nueva Planta was reinstated. However, 
the end of the war, and especially the signing of the Peace 
of Vienna (1725), marked the consolidation of the Bour-
bon regime inside Catalonia. Even as late as 1735, there 
was a minor reprise of the guerrilla actions dovetailing 
with the new international war.
However, from that year on, Austriacism ceased to be a 
viable dynastic alternative. What remained, coined “per-
sistent Austriacism” by Ernest Lluch,51 was merely nostal-
gia for the lost constitutions. This spirit permeated the dif-
ferent initiatives aimed at bringing back the institutions 
which were launched under the new legal system, such as 
the Memorial de Greuges (Record of Grievances) submit-
ted to the Bourbon King Charles III in 1760 by representa-
tives of the cities of Zaragoza, Valencia, Barcelona and 
Palma. The nostalgia for the former regime in the Nueva 
Planta was still present during the Peninsular War (1808-
1814) and in the early stages of the Liberal Revolution.
Eighteenth century Catalonia experienced a climate of 
ongoing political occupation, as Lluís Roura has pointed 
out.52 However, the brutality with which the pedagogy of 
repression was exercised gradually combined with the de-
velopment of mechanisms of integration or adaptation to 
the new regime. This process had gotten underway dur-
ing the 1719 crisis and was even more evident among cer-
tain swaths of the leading classes and what we could call 
the “people of order”.53
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